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Trolls, Hackers, Anons
Conspiracy Theories in the Peripheries of the Web
M T*
 : Trolls, Hackers, Anons: Cospirazioni e complotti nelle
periferie del Web.
: Conspiracy theories permeate through every level of the Web.
The semiotic features of this medium lead to mistrust, misunderstan-
ding, and aberrant interpretations entailing a mythological approach
to meaning. The essay investigates the relations between conspiracy
theories and the semiotic features of a peculiar area of the Web: its
peripheries. In particular, the essay focuses on the so–called “A-culture”,
hosted in the boards of sites such as chan and chan. In order to study
the semiotic dynamics that promote the rise of conspiracy theories, the
essay singles out a particularly challenging case study: the violent Web
dispute about video games and feminism, known as #GamerGate.
: Web and Internet; Conspiracy Theories; Play; #GamerGate.
. Introduction
Michael Barkun in A Culture of Conspiracy () outlines three
principles of conspiracy theories: ) nothing happens by accident;
) nothing is at it seems; and ) everything is connected. The first
principle is strictly connected with what says Mattew Dentith ( ):
a conspiracy theory is the attempt to explain a significative event with
a significant cause — which, as Dario Martinelli reminded us, is one
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. In the Meetings on Meaning –, dedicated to Semiotics of Conspiracy
Theories.
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of the basic needs to whom humanity answer with the creation of
myths. Conspiracy theories, therefore, are products of a desperate
need of meaning facing the inability to easily interpret reality.
The second principle — on deception — is also firmly connected to
semiotic activities: if nothing is what it seems, it means that everything
is a symbol, or a clue, of something else. We can see the roots of this
concept from the etymology of the word “conspiracy” itself, which
means to “blow together” or to “whisper together”, implying, on the
one hand, secrecy and on the other hand, conventionality among the
conspirators.
Finally, the third principle, relates to an other word, often used to
describe conspiracy theories: plot. This etymon, also used in many
other languages to indicate conspiracies (“complot” Spanish, “Koplott”
German) literally means to be “bent”, or “bent together” and therefo-
re bound together. The word “plot” is also connected with the textile
area, indicating “fabric”, or “cloth”, and to the textual area (from the
latin “textus”, that means “fabric”, again) referring to the disposition
of events in a narration. Similarly, the Italian word “trama” indicates,
at the same time, a machination, the intricacy of a piece of cloth, and
a story. Conspiracy theories, hence, seem to be inextricably related to
weaving — as much as narration is.
In addition, there is one last word, semantically connected to the-
se, “web”, which nowadays is used to metonymically indicate one
of the most important infrastructure of our time: the World Wide
Web, the enormous hypertext that contains much of the information
exchanged on the Internet.
Arguably it may be no accident, therefore, if the Web is one of the
most productive cradles of conspiracy theories, being the very meta-
phor that we use to understand it, deeply connected with the genesis
of conspiracies. Additionally, the Web also features characteristics that
match perfectly with Barkun’s other two principles, consisting in a
hypertext at the same time puzzling and soaked of secrecy.
In this paper we will approach the relationships between conspiracy
theories and the semiotics features of a very peculiar area of the Web:
its peripheries. In particular we will focus on the so–called A-culture
(Auerbach ) hosted in some boards of sites such as chan and
. As in Nelson (): a multi–pronged digital text which parts are connected by links.
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chan. In order to investigate the semiotic issues that promote the
rise of conspiracy theories, will dedicate a paragraph to a particularly
challenging case study: the violent Web dispute about video games
and feminism, known as #GamerGate.
. The Peripheries of the Web
In this chapter we will approach the Web with the tools and theories
of semiotics of culture, which are, in my opinion, particularly indicated
to map such a complex and ever changing reality such as the one
that the Internet hosts. I have already proposed such approach on
the pages of this very journal (Thibault, forthcoming), therefore this
paragraph will be dedicated to a brief recap of its main assumptions,
in order to be able to continue with our investigation.
.. The Semiosphere of the Web
The word “periphery” that I used to indicate a precise and characteri-
stic area of the Web, is obviously borrowed from Juri Lotman’s theory
of the semiosphere — i.e. the smaller working semiotic mechanisms,
the minimum unit of semiosis (Lotman ) that surrounds every
single culture. The semiosphere, hence the semiotic space of a culture,
appears to both enclose the Web and be overtaken by it. On the one
hand, the texts forming the Web are undoubtedly part of the cultu-
re, but, on the other hand, however they are not limited to a single
culture.
The Web, therefore, has to be considered as a transversal set of
texts, delimited by the overlapping of the immense hypertext of the
Web and the semiosphere. The presence of the Web in a single culture,
hence, is determined by the intersections between its semiosphere
and the hypertext, and therefore bill be a two–dimensional section
of a sphere. This section, however, follows the general organization
and structure of the whole semiosphere, and presents all the featu-
res and dynamics described by Lotman in his works: the hierarchy
. Let’s think at social networks such as Vkontacte or renren, which are internal to
the Web but external to the semiosphere of western culture
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between a rigid, but influential center and a free and dynamic peri-
phery, the continuous movement of textualities from the latter to the
first, the existence of an external border working as a porous space of
translation and so on.
Regarding the Web, the periphery — described by Lotman as
the most innovative, dynamic, and fertile area of culture, but also
limited to a minority of individuals — hosts what we can generally call
“subcultures”, including fandoms, religious sects, political extremists
and, subcultures connected to the concepts of geekiness and nerdism.
Their websites and texts are generally unknown to the majority of
the public, and their ideologies are more often than not opposed, or
at least alternatives, to those that we can find at the center.
.. The Internet
The situation that we have described, with the Web present in every
area of culture, represents only our current situation. When the In-
ternet was a novelty, known only to a small circle of experts, it was
a peripheral phenomenon — as happens to all cultural innovations
limited, at the beginning, to a set of individuals and/or to the younger
generations.
When the Web was born a small community of users arose, strictly
connected with geek and nerd subcultures, formed by individuals
that, for passion or for profession, happened to surf in the all new
World Wide Web. This community shared a system of values and of
ideologies (notably including a radical separation between reality and
virtual world) and a strong feeling of belonging to the medium.
With time, however, the Web underwent to a process that made of
it of central importance in the semiosphere, maybe the most impor-
tant medium of all. From the peripheries, the Web has been deformed
towards the center of the semiosphere (see Lotman ). Millions
of new users started surfing and the Web itself changed greatly. Not
much of the original Web is still existing today.
The Web subculture, nevertheless, survived and it is still situated in
the periphery of the semiosphere, mostly gathered around forums and
imageboards such as gaia online or the infamous chan. The latter
. Even if fairly unkonwn to the public, gaia online, forum dedicated to manga and
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is an imageboard founded in , whose users interact in complete
anonymity sharing and commenting images, generally employing a
wide range of highly formalized practices of textual production and
sharing. Most of the Internet memes (Marino ) were invented
there and, even if not much famous, it has a large influence, in the Web
and even outside it — the infamous collective of hackivists known as
Anonymous was born on chan’s random borad /b/.
This part of the peripheries of the Web and its pragmatics is ge-
nerally referred to by its users with the synecdoche “the Interent”.
In this chapter, we too, hence, will use (improperly) the expression
“the Internet” to refer to the same area as opposed to “the Web”
representing the whole World Wide Web.
.. A-Culture
Auerbach () renames “A–Culture” the subculture hosted on the
Internet and tries to outline the features of this community and its
users. He argues that the members of A-culture, are often individual
suffering of a social stigma — as the aforementioned geek and nerds,
but also Japanese otaku — that find in the Web a new home in a
sort of parallel reality, where their stigma and separation from reality
becomes something to be proud of. This pride, according to Auerbach,
becomes the typical form of elitism that can be found in the Internet
(see also Thibault forthcoming).
The “elite of the elite”, the most prominent examples of members
of the A-culture are the Anons, the anonymous users of some boards
of chan and chan — notoriously /b/, /v/ and /baphomet/.
A-Culture has the features of what Lotman defines a culture orien-
ted towards the expression (i.e. a culture that believes that what is
outside of it is wrong) and in particular, Anons strongly oppose the
websites of the center of the semiosphere because such sites promote
the Web as a prosthesis of real life. The identity of their users is strictly
connected to their offline identities (e.g. the selfie, a way to “translate”
oneself into the Web) which represents all the Internet hates: sharing
anime is believed to be the most prolific forum in history, with the highest number of post,
among which one that counts more than a million pages of comments. In this case the
hybridization between different subcultures is self evident
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real data, not protecting one’s identity, and mixing the real to the
virtual.
.. The Web between play and reality
Peripheral Web is based on the fundamental distinction between Web
and every day reality. The economy of unreality described by Auer-
bach is the core of the Internet: suspicion it’s its natural consequence,
and offense a way to protect it.
The Internet claims and protects the Web’s unreality refusing
any contagion with reality and antagonizing users and websites that
promote such confusion. However, even if the Internet is structured
as an alternative space to reality, with different values and ideologies,
this distinction doesn’t make it ontologically any less real than other
parts of the Web. What we are facing, thus, is a different semiotic
domain, and in particular a playful one.
The playful character of the Internet is intrinsic both to the texts it
produces (e.g internet memes) and to its pragmatics (every interaction
between users is oriented to jokes, irony, or complicity).
However, this feature of the Internet and of its texts is rarely com-
municated, but its taken for granted, making for an external viewer
extremely difficult to correctly interpret it. The metacommunication
of the playful intentions — for Bateson () essential to any play —
is entrusted to the context: for an internet user everything on the Web
is a joke and should not be taken seriously. This also explains why
the Internet is often seen from outsiders as a place of the Web full of
harassers, misogynists, homophobes and porn maniacs oriented to
violence, hate speeches and sadistic practices.
If we consider the Internet as inherently playful, then, we can claim
that two different semiotic domains — the playful and the real — are
competing to be hegemonic over the Web. The results of this quarrel,
as we will see, can lead to significant misunderstanings.
. Which is, of course, a rethorical and narrative construction as well as the playful
one.
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. The rules of the Internet: a constitution
.. Welcome to the Internet
The Internet’s conscience of the separation between online and offline
(which is absent in websites like Google or Amazon) is one of the
things that makes the peripheries of the Web semiotically interesting,
as it entails the awareness of the uniqueness of online communication.
Tracing a sharp boundary between online and offline allows the users
of the Internet to discern and describe more thoroughly the features
that characterize it. These descriptions assume, of course, the form
of the texts that are massively produced in these areas of the Web:
Internet memes.
A particularly interesting meme is the so–called list of the “Rules
of the Internet”. This list, born in  in the random board /b/ of
chan, is both prescriptive and descriptive an mainly sarcastic and
ironic. However, this meme sketch an interesting portrait of the
Internet and of the Web in general. In this paragraph, therefore, we
will focus on some of them, and in particular to those pertaining to
anonymity and to the economy of suspicion — in other words: those
related to conspiracies.
.. The rules
The first two rules of the Internet: «Rule . Do not talk about /b/»
and «Rule . Do not talk about /b/» are clearly a parody of the “rules
of the Fight Club” from the homonym film by David Fincher ( ).
Their connection with conspiracy theories is self evident: on the one
hand they reveal a taste for fiction about conspiracies, on the other
hand they are also symptomatic of a certain measure of xenophobia:
these rules state that the community must be concealed from the
outsiders who are perceived as potential dangers.
The next rules are «Rule . We are Anonymous» and «Rule . Ano-
nymous is legion». They are also born as a joke: as most people on
chan posted as “Anonymous” soon someone started to pretend that
Anonymous was a single person, even if manifold (hence the diabo-
lical claim of Anonymous being legion). These rules underline the
importance of anonymity, which was common in the primordial Web,
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but nowadays fought off by all the Web’s big companies. Anonymi-
ty is, again, a typical trait of conspirators or, at least, to their more
“romantic” images. The fact that the group of hackivists called “Ano-
nymous” (born on chan and whose name was a direct reference to
the Rule ) uses as symbol the mask of Guy Fawkes — well known
British conspirator and whose mask is used also by the eponymous
character of V for Vendetta ( James McTeigue, ) — is another proof
of the Anons’ love for conspiracy narratives.
Partially connected with the idea of conserving anonymity on the
Internet is also the «Rule . There are no girls on the Internet» that
can be interpreted as reinforcement of Rule : anonymity has no
gender, no one should ever reveal it’s own sex inchan (Manivannan
). On the other hand, however, this rule can be also interpreted in
another (non exclusive) way, as stating that anyone claiming of being
a girl on the internet is probably not — as well as everyone claiming
to be a child is in reality an FBI agent, as another popular meme says.
This concept dates back to the original Web, when the female users
were very few, and many men exploited the complete obscurity of
the empiric author to pretend to be females. Again, we are facing a
culture of suspicion, in which nothing is what it seems, and the rule
is to doubt in every occasion. On the same line is «Rule . Pics or
Didn’t Happen» that requires to provide proof for every claim made
on the Internet, that will otherwise considered false.
Masks and unmasking appear therefore to be central to the Inter-
net ideology, probably because deeply rooted in the medium itself.
The empirical author being irremediably out of reach, the semiotic
competence of the Web is (or has been) mainly the ability of interpre-
ting correctly its hidden intentions and objectives. The Web makes it
really easy for everyone to create their own mask, and thus, celebra-
ting unmasking, “the rules of the Internet” are celebrating the ability
to understand and use correctly the medium.
. Roles and communities of the Internet
In order to be able to investigate the dynamics of Internet conspira-
cies, a last order of premises is needed, regarding their actors (in a
Greimasian sense). In the next few paragraphs I will briefly approach
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Figure . Trollface, meme used to explicit one’s playful intention after trolling
some of the most important groups of users of the peripheries of the
Web and try to sketch a sort of “semio–ethnography” of the Internet.
These groups are often delineated by the pragmatics of their Web
interactions, more that by any other feature. In other words, these
groups are designated by thematic roles defining their communicative
characteristics.
.. Trolls
“To troll” means to advocate in an aggressive and often illogical way
an unpopular opinion, in order to start an argument with other users.
The troll doesn’t try to convince its interlocutor and will not change
opinion: its sole goal is creating and maintaining conflict, and the more
the argument becomes heathen, the better for the troll. Nowadays,
the term “trolling” is used for any form of aggressive deception and
hoax on the Web, if the goal is the troll’s fun. This led some scholar
to dramatically define trolls as “the sadists of the Internet” (Buckels,
Paulhus e Trapnell ) and, more in general, to the idea that trolls
are disturbed individuals.
From a semiotic perspective, a troll is someone who exploits the
impossibility to reach the empiric author of a message typical of the
Web, to hide his identity and his intentio, behind a very well defined
(even caricatured) model author in order to delude the receiver of
the message. The playful nature of this practice is evident, as it deals
with illusion (from the Latin ludere, “to play”) and fun. This form of
play isn’t new, of course, it is what is generally called a “joke” (from
the Latin iocus, meaning “fun”, “jest”), but, if for many jokes the
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point is exactly the revelation of its playful nature (let’s think of candid
cameras), trolls do never reveal their true intentions.
Even if most trolls are part of A-culture, they generally operate on
very central websites: primarily the Youtube comment section, followed
by Twitter, Facebook and Tumblr. There are attempts of trolling also
in the boards of chan, but they have a lot less success: after all there
are two rules of the Internet that explain clearly how to deal with trolls:
«Rule . All your carefully picked arguments can easily be ignored» and
«Rule . Do not argue with a troll — it means that they win».
Even if the rule “Don’t feed the troll” is universal, many of the users
of the central areas of the Web do not have the competences to identify
and avoid trolls, and therefore fall into their traps. This competence,
is the competence is a semiotic domain (and, in particular, in a playful
semiotic domain) and it is a fundamental trait required of any user of the
Internet. The ability to understand if someone is trolling you, and hence
to ignore every provocation, avoiding to become a “lulcow”, reflect the
understanding of the playful nature of the Internet.
What we are facing, therefore, is the result of the war between two
different conceptions of the Web, one as prosthesis of the real world,
and another as virtual playground, free from every social norm. Trolls
don’t communicate their playful intentions, because on the Internet
«Nothing has to be taken seriously» (Rule). The Web, according to
them, is meant as a place to play into, and those who don’t understand
it and make the mistake of taking things seriously deserve to become
lulcows, and to be “milked” for fun.
The Internet however, is peripheral, and the number of users
that know the “true nature” of the Web is exiguous. Knowing this
“secret” becomes for them being part of a sort of conspiracy, where
only an elected few know what is really happening, while the others’
judgment is clouded. That’s why chan and Anonymous often employ
trolling for their raids against people or organizations (as the famous
raid against Scientology). In this way the troll become the agent of a
conspiracy and uses the weapons of irony and sarcasm to fight those
who fail to understand that the Web is only one big joke.
. See also the Italian online joke “Gattini per Salvini”, a quite successful raid consisting
in posting images of cats, the “true rulers of the internet”, on the internet accounts of
extreme right politician Matteo Salvini.
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.. Hackers
The hacker is thematic role much loved by the Internet and a quite
common trope in many works of fiction, mainly focusing on him
as a young genius (see War Games, John Badham, ) or a mystic
figure (especially in The Matrix, Laurence and Andrew Wachowski
). Real life hackers are individuals capable of exercising an unusual
control on the medium and to break its rules, generally in order to
acquire information. They do not simply use the medium to com-
municate, but they can communicate with the medium, and hence
manipulate it.
Really skilled hackers, however, are rather few, and the importance
of this thematic role is more a mythological one that a social one. This
role fascinates the Internet, not only with fiction, but also thanks to
famous real like hackers and activists like Julian Assange, the founder
of Wikileaks. The prestige of this role among the users of the Internet
is probably due to its two major characteristics: the first one is the
outstanding computer science competences he possesses; the second
one is its ability to unmask, to manage the revelations. The latter
is strictly connected with the economy of suspicion that permeates
the Internet, from this perspective a hacker is mainly a debunker,
someone capable of see under the surface and to reveal conspiracies
by unmasking the actions of the conspirators and finding the proofs.
One of the easiest — and therefore more common — actions
linked to hacking is doxing, which is the act of discover the real
identity of a Web user and share online is data: personal address, family
composition, e–mail, contact and, sometimes, even passwords. Doxing
has a clear intimidating nature, displaying the force and ability of the
hacker and leaving the victim exposed and defenseless. However,
most of the times these information are used only to make fun of the
victim, who will receive online–ordered pizzas at home in the middle
of the night or will be unwillingly subscribed to many spam mailing
lists. In other words: doxing is used to bring trolling outside the Web
into the real world.
It could seem an oxymoron that people valuing very much anony-
mity are so willing to unmask others and reveal their identities online.
I think that there are three, non exclusive possible interpretations that
may allow us to understand better what is doxing:
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— doxing is a test of someone’s hacking abilities, ant thus is part
of the qualification of the subject;
— doxing can be interpreted as a performance that excludes from
the Web individuals that do not protect well enough their iden-
tities. At the same time it denounces the risk of sharing data on
the Web, and claims the latter for those embracing anonymity;
— doxing may be seen as an invasion of the real world by the play-
ful space of the Web. It brings trolling in real life, overturning
the balance of power between real and virtual, and affirming
the superiority of the latter.
.. Gamers
This is a quite vast thematic role, semantically derived by the action
of playing video games. According to recent studies playing video
games is mostly an adult occupation, and women play almost as
much as men. The prototypical image of the “gamer”, however, is
completely different, and has its roots in an early stage of gaming
and in an assimilation between the stereotypes of gamers and nerds.
From this perspective gamers are often described as white teens with
no social life who are generally porn–obsessed obese virgins. These
stereotypes are still astonishingly alive and played an important part
in the #GamerGate quarrel.
On the other hand, not every video game player consider himself
or herself a gamer — term that, in fact, is not well defined. In many
websites and boards populated by gamers, as the board /v/ of chan,
there have been many discussions of what is to be a “gamer”. Many,
for example, have criticized studies reporting that more adult women
play video games than teenage boy (source: Entertainment software
association), claiming that playing Candy Crush Saga as a pastime
doesn’t make someone a gamer. If some of the criticisms to these
quantitative analysis may have a point, they are also the sign of the
strong xenophobia that permeates the gamers’ subculture. For many
years very strong prejudices against gamers were quite common, and
video games were thought to hurt the brain or to induce violence,
even if recent studies claim the exact opposite (Ferguson  and
. http://phys.org/news/--women-men-video-games.html.
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Przybylski ). This social stigma, thus, has probably boosted the
cohesion of the group and reinforced the suspicion and hostility
towards anyone outside the group.
The similarities between the subculture surrounding the Internet
and the gamer’s subculture may seem many. However, these two
groups only partially overlaps, and many similarities are mainly due
to the fact of their being communities situated in the periphery of the
semiosphere. Gamers are not a primarily online community, but, at
the contrary, considers themselves to be gamers also in everyday life.
.. Sockpuppets
Sockpuppets are deceiving enunciative devices typical of the Web.
The term is used to indicate accounts reporting false information and
hiding the identity of the user behind them. Sockpuppets are fake
virtual prosthesis, marionettes, and may be used for many reasons:
to troll avoiding recognition, to overcome a ban, to pretend to be
of another sex or race, or to undermine an position in an argument
by claiming to support it and making meaningless points. The same
individual can use different sockpuppets at the same time, manipu-
lating the perception of its individuality and presenting himself like
multitude — a sometimes very useful meaning effect.
From a semiotic standpoint a sockpuppet is a particularly articu-
lated and explicit model author that the empiric author employ to
influence, through techniques on émbrayage, his model readers.
As for conspiracies, the mere existence of the possibility of creating
a sockpuppet encourage suspect and mistrust on the Web, hence the
actions taken by the most central Websites against all fake accounts.
.. Social Justice Warriors and Feminazis
On the Internet the expression “Social Justice Warrior” indicates Web
users that hypocritically exploit the promotion of social justice as
a way to ask for attention and to improve their offline image. The
website Encyclopedia Dramatica, a Wikipedia parody describing the
Internet, in the page dedicated to Social Justice claims:
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The main purpose of SOCIAL JUSTICE is not to enact actual change or
forward progress. If it were, no one would give a fuck. In fact the primary
reason for its existence is to allow white people to impress other white
people with how accepting and totally sensitive they are. Due to being over
privileged teenagers with too much time on their Internet hands, they have
never actually experienced OPPRESSION. So, they merely wing it. Utilizing
their caresonas to yell at others about how they are ruining other peoples
lives with harmful blog posts.
This is a form of identity crafting that is strongly antagonized by
the Internet. Needless to say that accusing someone of being a Social
Justice Warrior is a very easy way to delegitimize his or her position
and arguments, without actually engaging with them. However, again,
the basic idea that on the Internet nothing has to be taken seriously,
and that the Web is not the place in which to fight effectively for social
justice may bring most of its users to believe that anyone defending
liberal ideas on the Web is loosing its time.
One of the main issues of #GamerGate, as we will see, is feminism
which, especially in its online forms, on the Internet is often coarsely
associated with Social Justice Warriors. Because of the general igno-
rance on the topic (one of the common argument is: «if it is about
equality, why isn’t it called equalism?»), of some hard–to–believe hoa-
xes (as the false news of a feminist aborting her male child to avoid to
“give birth to a monster” or the fake feminist movement to abolish
“father day” orchestrated by chan) and of some undeniable exagge-
ration (like the journalist shaming scientist Matt Taylor for his shirt
in an interview about the successful mission of space probe Rosetta)
the Internet is often not a feminist–friendly place, when not openly
misogynistic on the topic.
Things, however, are more complex than it might appear. Emma
Watson, for example, who is considered being the “crush of the In-
ternet”, is a outspoken feminist, and her speech at United Nations (in
September , as Goodwill Ambassador for UN Women) was ge-
nerally appreciated also from many users of the Internet. In addition,
some feminist, as Christina Hoff Sommers, have taken the side of the
. https://encyclopediadramatica.se/Social_justice.
. Original blog post: http://injusticestories.com/i-aborted-my-baby-because-it-was-a-boy/.
. http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/events/endfathersday.
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gamers in #GamerGate, and are quite popular among them.
Hence, following (unintentionally) another kind of rule of the Web,
the Godwin Law, the term “Feminazi” was born, in order to distin-
guish the Social Justice Warrior feminists and the “men haters” from
the “true feminists” who advocate equality. The oversimplification
and general confusion is blatant, but it is symptomatic: when a com-
munity based on communicative practices have to face a political idea
the latter can appeal to some of its users and be disliked by others. In
order to keep the community united, the idea is either articulated in
one positive and one “nazi” side easy to deal with, or translated to a
mere fact of communication pragmatics.
. The #Gamergate: a case study
The #GamerGate controversy is an heterogeneous and extremely
complex internet flamewar that started in august  and to the day,
it hasn’t completely ended. What I will do in this paragraph is to try
to outline the development and the features of this controversy and
to investigate how they were affected by the patterns typical of conspi-
racy theories and by the semiotic and communicative characteristics
of Web communication in general, and the Internet’s in particular.
The controversy has been extremely animated — death threats have
been received in both sides — and has taken place mostly on Twitter,
where between August and November the hashtag #GamerGate
alone has been used  million time: almost  times a day. Also
the Wikipedia page of the controversy has become for some time a
battlefield resulting on mass bans. The comment sections of many
blogs and websites that have dedicated entries and articles to the
subject has also become quite often hosting spaces of the discussions,
again with many bans and, sometimes, explicit regimes of censorship.
. «As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison involving
Nazis or Hitler approaches ».
. The reconstruction will be based on the narrations about them build by the two sides
(Kotaku, Gamasutra ecc on the one hand, Knowyourmeme and Enciclopedya Dramatica on
the other) and on my personal, and hopefully more objective, observation of the phenome-
non. I monitored the hastags #GamerGate, #Stopgamergate  and #notyourshield from
September  to February , when the controversy reached its peak.
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.. Genealogy of flame war
What was the principal subject of all these discussions? It would appear
that the main topic was the nature itself of the factions, in particular
of the #GamerGate movement. On the one hand, people hostile to
GamerGaters accuse them of being a misogynist hate group attacking
women in the video game industry in order to intimidate them and
preserve the straight, white, male hegemony in the world of digital
playfulness. The people that identify under the banner of the #Ga-
merGate, on the other hand, refuse these accusations, claiming to be
a diverse movement (the hashtag #notyurshield has been created and
supposedly used by women, minorities and homosexual that identify
with GamerGaters — although the reality of these claims has been
put into question by critics claiming that these accounts are, in fact,
sockpuppets) fighting against corruption and dishonesty in the media.
It is clear that the narrations of the two sides of the quarrel are
extremely different. In order to try to shed some light on the birth
of such narratives, we will here try to reconstruct, very briefly, the
events that made explode the quarrel.
In August the th , Eron Gjony publishes a blog entry about Zoe
Quinn, award–winning game developer with whom he was in a romantic
relationship until that moment. In his blog Gjony claimed that Quinn had
many affairs while still being with him, some of which with video game
journalists — one of them being part of the jury that assigned the award
to Quinn. To support his claims he published a series of screenshots
which he claimed showed messages between him and Quinn.
The day after, Internet Aristocrat, a quite influential youtuber, re-
leased a video about the “Quinnspiracy theory”. In this video Internet
Aristocrat accuses Quinn to be «using sex to influence journalists and
for portraying herself as a victim to receive donations and support».
The reaction of this video and to Gjony blog entry where twofold.
On the one hand many people started to question how her personal
relationships affected her career, and if judges and video game jour-
nalists could still be considered trustworthy. In the subsequent days
Quinn was victim of many ferocious and violent attacks, insults and
even death–threats on the Web (mainly on twitter, but also on Tum-
. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SbILqkODY.
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Figure . “Gamers are dead” blog title collection
blr). On the other hand, many people have been supportive with her,
and accused Gjony of being misogynistic and of having written his
accusations with the sole intentions to punish Zoe Quinn for having
left him. In these days the hashtag #GamerGate was firstly created.
Few days later, the th — also following a wave of criticisms, mixed
again with insults and threats received by feminist youtuber Anita
Sarkeesian in response of a series of videos focusing on misogyny
in video games — all the most important new websites and blogs
dedicated to digital games (The Financial Post, Ars Technica, The
Daily Beast, The Stranger, Beta Beat, Gamasutra, Polygon and Kotaku)
dedicated articles and entries to the end of the identity of the “gamer”,
accusing them to be a spoiled hate group of misogynists and online
harassers, and stating that game developers shouldn’t consider them
their target audience, anymore (Fig. ).
The synchronicity of the response has been immediately interpreted
as the proof of a conspiracy (“everything is connected”) and the disco-
very of a mailing list, called “gamejournopros” in which the authors
of these articles were discussing how to respond to the vicious attacks
against Zoe Quinn has been seen by many GamerGaters as a confirma-
tion of their suspicions. chan’s board /v/, dedicated to video games
become the basis for a counter conspiracy, in which GamerGaters coor-
dinated attacks, actions and trolling operations. At least at the beginning,
however, the majority of the posts on /v/ invited to avoid threats and
insults, and focused on how dismantle the conspiracy they believed was
held against them. One of their first actions has been to write to the
companies that were advertised in the websites that had claimed the
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“gamers” dead, menacing to boycott them if they continued to support
the websites that, they claimed, were attacking their very consumers.
This strategy proved itself successful, in a certain measure, entailing the
cancellation of several contracts, among which those held by Intel.
Insults and threats however, continued, and soon where answered
with other insults and other threats: rapidly the quarrel become a
proper flame war, fought with screenshots, doxings, accuses of being
sockpuppets or trolls and banning requests.
Most of the blogs dedicated to video games joined the cause of the
“anti–gg”, while their opponents gained the endorsement of different
personalities, as British tech journalist Milo Yiannopoulos and feminist
writer Christina Hoff Sommers. Since then the attention to the quarrel
started to slowly decline, but the flame war still hasn’t seen an end.
.. Doxing, lies and paranoia
The quarrel per se it is not very interesting, at least from a semiotic
perspective. There are, however, two aspects of this quarrel, that in
my opinion are worth further investigation. The first one is a cultural
one: the two sides of the dispute seem to be absolutely unable to
understand each–other systems of values and ideologies, and their
semiospheres seem to be too different to allow any dialog. On the one
hand many of the GamerGaters’ claims show a complete ignorance
not only about feminism, about its history and ideas, but also about
journalism, seeing as a conspiracy the fact that journalists might com-
municate and discuss their ideas between them, and even pursuing
agendas different from pleasing their customers. On the other hand,
the anti–gg are blatantly unable to understand the workings of the
Web. Redditor Spawnpointgard, on Reddit provided a lucid analysis
of this cultural gap from the Internet’s point of view:
Like any problem, SJWs attempt to solve the troll issue by “raising awareness”.
To people who don’t understand the Internet (like every major news outlet),
. Which probably tells us something about the state of digital capitalism and of the
economic system of immediate feedback and online ratings.
. https://www.reddit.com/r/KotakuInAction/comments/syq/a_history_of_
chan_culture_and_how_it_relates_to/.
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SJWs look like courageous individuals finally taking a stand against online
harassment. To us, they look like morons trying to feed the trolls to death.
If you’re the target of online harassment, don’t promote it. Don’t even
respond to it. Don’t be anyone’s lulcow.
The second semiotically interesting aspect of this quarrel, is the
importance that the characteristics of the medium play in the creation
of opposite narratives which often reflects a conspirative way of thin-
king. We have already claimed that the fact that the empirical author
of any online message is unreachable and hidden lead to question
his nature, his identity and his agenda. In the narrative of the Web,
this is mirrored by the impossibility to connect actors and actants, to
identify with certainty who did what. A few days after the publication
of the Quinnspiracy video, for instance, Zoe Quinn claimed to be
the victim of an hacker attack and a doxing: a post on her Tumblr
revealed her telephone numbers and was signed “/V/”. Eventually,
blogger The spectacular spider–girl, stated that, in her opinion, the
doxing was staged and accused Quinn to be behind it. The spectacular
spider–girl claimed that, seen Tumblr security features, which would
disconnect multiple users on to the same account, it should had been
impossible for Quinn to denounce the hack from her own hacked
account. Additionally she stated that nobody from /v/ would never
write the board’s own name with an unacceptable capital letter, sugge-
sting that Quinn herself staged her own doxing to gain more support.
The virtual impossibility to proof or disproof this new conspiracy
theory makes its acceptance inevitably a matter of faith, and only
reinforces the existence of two different, incompatible narratives.
Interestingly enough, when to months later the personal data of
game designer Brianna Wu were released publicly on /v/, the reaction
of the Anons to the doxing where of two kinds: firm condemn of any
doxing and ironical skepticism — many Anons responding something
like: «Brianna, please, we don’t care about your data. Stop pretending
to be a victim».
. http://thespectacularspider-girl.tumblr.com/post//zoe-quinn-fake-
doxxhack.
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. The ineffable nature of the Web
Without denying that online harassment is a problem — and a big
one, what we are facing is a tremendous amount of texts, mostly
contradictory, supporting two (if not more) different narrations with
claims that cannot be verified by any means.
We don’t really have any real data in our hands. Numbers can
easily be faked and are, thus, insignificant: if identifying a single
sockpuppet is, sometimes, easy, when one have to deal with hundreds
of them it may become impossible. We also can’t unequivocally in-
terpret the intentio auctoris behind any of these texts, nor discern
between honest authors and trolls supporting the same cause. In some
cases, someone may use sockpuppets to cause more naive users to
follow, honestly, their example.
Even if it is possible, sometimes, to reconstruct the goals and iden-
tity of the author of a text on the Web, being sure is generally a very
difficult task, often requiring good computer skills. Most of the times,
therefore, the user’s approach to the interpretation of online texts is
necessarily uncritical and based only on trust. If the latter is misplaced,
then, being prey of hoaxes may be extremely simple.
Finally, the coexistence of different semiotics domains on the Web,
poses an additional obstacle to straightforward online communication.
The same messages can be radically different in different context or
with different intentions, and the corpus of any online conversation,
frequently, composed by hundreds or thousandths of texts, especially
in social media, can be extremely heterogeneous and hard impossible
to interpret.
All this semiotic issues increase suspicion, mistrust and misunder-
standing on the Web, often resulting in the spur of conspiracy theories,
which in this chaotic set of uninterpretable texts offer a simple way
out from this interpretative impasse.
For this reason it is fundamental that Web users — and most of
all Web scholars — approaching similar topics, especially when the
Internet is involved, are fully aware of the twofold nature of the
. There are evidences showing that Anons often started their cam-
paigns mobilizing thousandths of fake Twitter accounts, see, for example:
http://arstechnica.com/gaming///new-chat-logs-show-how-chan-users-
pushed-gamergate-into-the-national-spotlight/.
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medium. A single semiotic competence is not enough to be able to
interpret and study the Web: a conflict permeates it and opposes two
different online forms of life (Fontanille ), one associating online
practices with real life, and the other with freedom and playfulness.
Any attempt at approaching the Internet without recognizing this
two–faced semiotic nature (the existence of two different frames of
context) will be irremediably flawed.
It is indispensable, then, to remember that the Web is, unavoidably,
a virtual place and not an extension of society. It might be used as
one and it can be a mirror of society, but it doesn’t necessarily do so.
Failing to see the difference between reality and the Web, eventually
brings to aberrant decoding and hence it easily entails mythological
explanations and, thus, conspiracy theories.
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